Background
In their inuential paper Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets Chiappori and Salanié (2000) proposed a test for asymmetric information using a French insurance claims data set, which contained a rich set of controls for the insurer's information set. In France, the insurer's information set includes the bonus-malus which is an index that reects automobile crash history.
A bivariate probit model was specied wherein the rst probit predicts the level of insurance and the second probit predicts the occurrence of a claim. The null hypothesis of no asymmetric information was tested with two parametric tests of the following hypotheses: (i) H 0 : cov(ε i , η i ) = 0 when the two probits are estimated separately and (ii) H 0 : ρ = 0 when the model is estimated as a bivariate probit. To control for the potentially confounding eects of adverse selection, the analysis was limited to a sub-population of beginner drivers. No evidence of asymmetric information was found. Chiappori and Salanié (2000, p. 72 ) then specied a test for moral hazard, which exploited ...a kind of natural experiment... the authors identied. The authors argue that, in France, a beginner driver can`inherit' their parent's bonus-malus coecient if they declare that their car is jointly-owned with their parents. The minimum bonus-malus index, which indicates a safe driver, is 0.5.
They construct a dichotomous variable. The inherited bonus-malus (IBM) is equal to one if the beginner driver inherits a bonus-malus coecient of 0.5 from their parent and zero if otherwise. This binary variable IBM is added to the Insurance and Claims probit models. They argue that two processes, moral hazard and familial correlation, enable the sign on the coecient for IBM in the Claims model to be utilized to test for ex ante moral hazard, as follows (the bold fonts are our emphasis):
Three possible stories can be considered: (1) ... parents' performances are positively correlated with the child's. Then the 50 percent bonus signals a better driver and should be negatively correlated with accident probability. (2) ... the parents' performances are uncorrelated with the child's, and there is no moral hazard. Then the 50 percent bonus is allocated randomly and should not matter for accident probabilities. (3) Finally, assume that parents' and child's performances are uncorrelated but there is some moral hazard. Then we are facing a kind of natural experiment, as some drivers face a dierent incentive scheme for exogenous reasons. Since the marginal cost (to the insured) of an accident is increasing with the bonus coecient, one should expect that a lower bonus coecient decreases incentives and thus leads to larger accident probabilities. (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000, pp. 71-72) .
Moreover, the results from this test for ex ante moral hazard continue to be promulgated and in 2013 were represented in the Handbook of Insurance as a quasi-natural experiment (Chiappori and Salanié, 2013) .
Analysis
Potentially there are two concerns with this test for moral hazard. The rst is analytical and relates to the claim that the two countervailing hypotheses, moral hazard and familial correlation produce three unambiguous eects on the sign on the IBM coecient (α IM B ). In Table 1 we construct a two-bytwo matrix of all possible interactions between familial correlation and moral hazard to demonstrate that there are in fact four possible eects combinations, not three. Cells 1, 2 and 3 correspond respectively to the Options 2, 3 and 1 as hypothesized by Chiappori and Salanié (2000, pp. 71-72) . However, the net eect identied in Cell 4 is ambiguous and could correspond to the outcome of cells 1, 2 or 3 if the magnitude of familial correlation is equal to, less than or greater than that of moral hazard, respectively. A second concern relates to the implicit assumption that the variable IBM was collected, but not used, by insurers to risk rate potential policyholders. Chiappori and Salanié (2000) proposed that the variable IBM be excluded from the insurer's information set for the purpose of conducting a natural experiment. However a natural experiment is typically understood as having occurred....when some (often unintended) feature of the setup we are studying produces exogenous variation in an otherwise endogenous explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 88) .
Contrary to the assertion that the drivers ...face a dierent incentive scheme for exogenous reasons (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000, p. 72) 
Conclusion
We hope that by drawing attention to these issues, other economists may be assisted in the dicult and ongoing task of dierentiating ex ante moral hazard and adverse selection empirically.
